A state enterprise for the balanced development of three civil airports

Proposal for public debate • 22 September 2026

The Republic of Moldova may consider setting up a public network of civil airports, administered by a single state enterprise. The proposal starts from the state enterprise “Chișinău International Airport” — hereinafter AIC — which would continue operating under the name “Airports of Moldova” and would manage the Chișinău, Bălți–Leadoveni and Cahul airports. What is at stake in the proposal is guaranteeing the balanced development of the airports in the north and south of the country, Bălți–Leadoveni and Cahul.

The integration of Bălți would be carried out through the absorption of Moldaeroservice, only if the situation in the insolvency file allows this operation and if creditors’ rights are respected. Cahul Airport would pass into state ownership through a legally justified and compensated expropriation, then be assigned to the management of the common operator. Mărculești would be removed from the civil component of this project and transferred to the administration of the Ministry of Defence.

This is a reform scenario. It does not describe a reorganization already completed, an expropriation already approved or a military transfer already decided. Its application depends on distinct legal, economic and technical checks for each airport.

Three airports with functions proportional to demand

Chișinău would remain the country’s main commercial airport and the operator’s centre of competence. The investment needed for its safety, capacity and service quality must be protected under any expansion scenario.

Bălți–Leadoveni could serve the north of the country, through phased development. Regional or charter flights, general aviation, maintenance and other services are options to be analysed through demand and technical-compatibility studies, without any premature promise of scheduled routes. For the north’s development to be guaranteed, not merely declared, the integration must provide for an anchor operator — for example a low-cost carrier —, a committed investment schedule and a clear niche function, as the cases of Kaunas and Kutaisi show.

Cahul could provide aeronautical infrastructure for the south. The level of investment and the types of operations must be established after assessing the airport’s condition, road access, demand and authorization costs. Surface access is decisive: where it was lacking, even new infrastructure has remained unused, so guaranteeing the south’s development depends on solving, at the same time, the access roads and the demand base. Common administration does not imply building three airports of the same size simultaneously.

The decision criterion

The reform is worth adopting if it guarantees the balanced development of the Bălți–Leadoveni and Cahul airports, with better connectivity and public services at a justified and verified total cost. Protecting the operation of Chișinău Airport remains a safety condition of the reform, not its purpose. Changing the name and concentrating the assets are administrative instruments; the result must be measured by services, useful investment and financial discipline. The decisive measure of success is whether Bălți and Cahul actually receive the planned investment and traffic, not merely whether Chișinău remains stable. That is why the proposal of a single state enterprise must be assessed against maintaining the current structure and against coordination among legally separate entities — options taken up in the sections on risks and implementation.

Moldaeroservice and the limit imposed by insolvency

The Public Property Agency indicates that the state enterprise “Moldaeroservice” has been in insolvency proceedings since 29 September 2022. Public information allows this date to be confirmed, but does not by itself establish the current stage of the file, the existence of a restructuring plan, or the current value of the claims. [1]

Absorption is a conditional option

Insolvency must be treated neither as permission for the free takeover of the assets, nor as sufficient proof that any reorganization is impossible. Insolvency Law no. 149/2012 provides for reorganization of the debtor among the measures that may appear in a restructuring plan. This general possibility does not, however, confirm that the specific absorption of Moldaeroservice by AIC is admissible at the current stage of the case. [2]

Before any decision, the state must obtain the updated file, the relevant rulings and the position of the insolvency administrator. An inventory of assets is needed, the situation of rights over land and buildings, the table of claims, the guarantees, the litigation, the obligations towards employees and any environmental obligations. The enterprise’s assets must be delimited from the state assets held in management. The inventory must also establish Moldaeroservice’s own receivables — the amounts the enterprise has to recover from its debtors, such as the administration of the “Bălți” Free Economic Zone, and the state’s unexecuted compensatory obligations under Government Decision no. 983/2010 —, since these are assets of the enterprise that must be recovered, not merely debts to be paid.

A Government decision, as founder, does not replace the judicial procedure and the mechanisms protecting creditors. The operation must be built in accordance with the insolvency law, the rules on reorganizing state enterprises and the public-assets regime, with the approvals of creditors and of the court required by the applicable procedure. [2–3]

The prudent path to integration

The first option to examine is financed restructuring and settlement of the debts, followed by absorption after the legal closure of the procedure. If reorganization is proposed within the procedure itself, feasibility must be confirmed for the specific case, and the operation included in the legal mechanism and in the approved plan, where this path is available.

Absorption must be assessed together with the liabilities and the risks taken over. It cannot be presented publicly as a mere transfer of the runway and land to AIC, with the debts disappearing. Symmetrically, the assessment must not ignore the receivables Moldaeroservice has to collect from third parties: they are part of the enterprise’s assets and, once recovered, reduce the net burden of the operation. For the absorbing operator, an independent valuation and an approved financing ceiling are essential before assuming the obligations.

If absorption is not possible or would endanger AIC, the legal acquisition of the airport assets through the mechanisms of the insolvency procedure may be analysed. This solution differs from a merger and must respect the creditors, the valuation and the regime of each asset. It does not justify the arbitrary withdrawal of assets from the debtor’s estate.

The conclusion is conditional: the integration of Bălți may remain the objective of public policy, but the absorption of Moldaeroservice must not be announced as achievable before the file and the full cost of the operation are verified.

Cahul and Mărculești need separate decisions

Cahul in state ownership

The proposed scenario assumes the state acquires the assets needed for Cahul Airport through expropriation for a cause of public utility. The existence of an airport objective does not automatically justify expropriating all the assets of a company, nor taking them over free of charge. The measure must be grounded in the Constitution and in the Law on expropriation for a cause of public utility no. 488/1999. [4]

The first step is cadastral and legal verification: the current owners, the land, the runway, the buildings, the access routes, the mortgages and the other rights of third parties. It must be specified exactly what is being expropriated and why each asset is necessary. The proposal does not start from the presumption that the entire complex belongs to a single owner or that its legal situation is already clarified.

The state must demonstrate the public utility and the proportionality of the intervention, provide for fair and prior compensation, and ensure the legal means of challenge. The valuation must also compare the cost of a negotiated purchase. The preference for a public operator does not remove the obligation to justify the expropriation.

The project cost includes the compensation, any litigation, the rehabilitation, the equipment, the staff and the authorization. After legal acquisition, the assets would be registered in state ownership and assigned to the operator “Airports of Moldova” in the form of management permitted by their legal regime. Acquiring the assets and the right to operate the airport are distinct stages.

Mărculești under the administration of the Ministry of Defence

The proposal implies a change from the direction publicly announced for Mărculești. On 9 September 2026, Moldova 1 reported the statement of the infrastructure minister according to which the land had been transferred to Chișinău airport, while the takeover of the other assets was still being prepared. Therefore, the transfer of the entire estate to AIC must not be assumed to be complete. [5]

The assets already managed by AIC would be transferred to the designated structure of the Ministry of Defence, on the basis of an inventory and the necessary documents. For the assets not yet taken over by AIC, the transfer route must be established starting from their actual legal holder. The impact on the special regime of the Mărculești Free International Airport, on the residents and on existing contracts must also be checked.

The justification for the transfer must be supported by defence needs, a technical assessment and a maintenance and investment budget. Changing the administrator does not certify the infrastructure’s fitness for military use. Airspace coordination, resolution of the staff situation and the explicit allocation of the obligations attached to the assets are needed.

The possible benefit is separating civil from military responsibility. The opportunity cost consists of giving up some commercial uses of Mărculești and the expenditure borne by the defence budget. These effects must be compared before the final decision.

Why Mărculești does not belong in the civil network

Beyond separating civil from military responsibility, several concrete arguments support removing Mărculești from the management of the common civil operator.

First, Mărculești is a former military aerodrome, and its special Free International Airport regime — with residents, contracts and free-zone facilities — does not fit a civil passenger-network operator. Its integration would overlap two different legal regimes and would complicate both the administration of the network and the situation of the existing residents. Moreover, the founder of the Mărculești enterprise is the Ministry of Defence (the 2004 Statute, approved on the basis of Government Decision no. 444/2002), and its main field of activity is air freight transport, not passenger transport; under Article 14 of the Statute, lease or cooperation contracts concluded without the founder’s consent are null. From the standpoint of competence, Mărculești already falls within the defence remit, not that of a civil operator. [27] The most recent aerodrome operating certificates for Mărculești reveal prohibitions on transporting both passengers and cargo.

Second, Mărculești’s readiness for civil passenger operations is not established. Historically, the most recent aerodrome-operator certificates issued to S.E. AIM authorize neither passenger nor cargo transport, or both; the runway strength classification determined only through operational observation and not through technical data (PCN 80/R/B/W/U) and the quality of the aeronautical data (for example the absence of any indication of the serious bird hazard identified) (AIP) are serious administrative impediments; the mandatory transition to the ACN-PCR method, in force since November 2024, adds a further non-conformity that would have to be remedied at some point even if the Republic of Moldova were to benefit from a temporary derogation in relation to ICAO. Therefore, Mărculești cannot be presented as a civil asset ready for use in the network.

Third, Mărculești and Bălți–Leadoveni serve essentially the same northern catchment. A rational civil network needs a single civil airport in the north — Bălți–Leadoveni, closer to the country’s second urban centre — not two platforms competing for the same limited demand. Keeping both within the same operator would dilute investment and create an internal conflict of interest in allocating routes and capital. Indeed, in the comparative audit of the two enterprises (Decision no. 32/2007), the Court of Accounts found that “following the operation of the Leadoveni airport, which meets the conditions of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), S.E. «Moldaeroservice» generated revenues of 22,000 lei and 99,000 lei respectively, serving only some «charter» flights” — that is, a genuine civil airport kept almost inactive (a finding confirmed also by Decision no. 18/2005, which noted that the Leadoveni runway had been brought to ICAO level, “but the runway is mothballed”). By contrast, Mărculești’s revenues came overwhelmingly from aircraft operations — leasing out state aircraft and registering foreign aircraft, through 10 contracts with firms from Greece, Luxembourg, Estonia and the USA —, contracts in which the Court found irregularities: tariffs without supporting calculations and the contract with the Greek firm “Asterias Comercial”, concluded without the approval of the Ministry of Defence. These findings contradict the need to “develop” a second airport at Mărculești. [28]

Fourth, including Mărculești in the civil network would risk perpetuating a state preference that is hard to justify: public allocations such as those provided by Law no. 232/2025 direct funds to Mărculești, although the technical and demand comparison with Bălți–Leadoveni does not support it. [26] In addition, presenting Mărculești as a project “within the EU Growth Plan” has no official support: neither the European Commission, nor the European Investment Bank, nor the EBRD confirm the inclusion or financing of the aerodrome within any European Union investment framework. [29]

Fifth, Mărculești has a documented history of cargo operations with serious governance problems: press investigations have revealed arms trafficking, embezzlement and fabricated debts of the order of tens of millions of lei. Such a profile justifies keeping the activity under state control and supervision, not integrating it into a commercial passenger operator. [25] Similar concerns appear in international reporting (OCCRP, the “Arms-Washing” investigation). [30]

Not least, Mărculești’s financial burden is much heavier than that of Bălți — its problem being chronic loss. According to Public Property Agency data, S.E. “Mărculești International Airport” recorded losses every year from 2019 to 2025, accumulating about 108 million lei (~€5.6 million) — roughly seven times more than Moldaeroservice (~15 million lei, 2019–2022). In 2024 its expenditure exceeded revenue by about 3.1 times (~24.7 million lei against ~7.9 million lei in revenue), and its net assets fell by about 65% (from ~266 to ~92 million lei), compared with about 33% at Moldaeroservice. Significantly, Mărculești’s current liquidity in 2025 (0.18) is already below the level at which Moldaeroservice entered insolvency (0.19 in 2022). [24]

Results in other countries are uneven

Lithuania and Estonia offer benchmarks for the public administration of an airport network. Georgia illustrates a mixed structure. The single-public-network-operator model is, moreover, widespread in Europe: Spain (AENA, about 46 airports), Norway (Avinor, 44), Finland (Finavia, 20) and Sweden (Swedavia, 10) administer most of their airports through a single state company, which supports the small airports through cross-subsidy within the network. [6] The comparison concerns states with relatively small markets; differences in tourism, geography and financing limit the transfer of results to Moldova. Traffic growth alone does not demonstrate profitability, nor the causal effect of common administration. For the development of Bălți and Cahul, both the cases in which public administration made regional airports grow and the cases in which regional infrastructure remained unused or dependent on subsidies are relevant — both are presented below.

Lithuania and the growth of regional airports

AB Lietuvos oro uostai operates Vilnius, Kaunas and Palanga. According to the operator, Kaunas grew from about 1.1 million passengers in 2019 to about 1.6 million in 2025, and Palanga from 338,000 to 448,000. The growth calculated on these figures is approximately 45% and 33%. These are positive traffic results for the secondary airports. [7]

Kaunas’s specialization in low-fare flights, maintenance and cargo, alongside Palanga’s regional role, shows the advantage of complementarity. The cited data do not, however, establish the separate profitability of each airport, or how much of the growth is due to the common operator. The legal form is a joint-stock company, different from the Moldovan state enterprise. For Bălți and Cahul, the lesson is developing functions justified by demand, not reproducing Lithuanian volumes.

Estonia and the economic limit of regional connectivity

AS Tallinna Lennujaam, wholly state-owned, operates five airports and two aerodromes. Its objectives explicitly include the public financing of the regional function. [8] The preliminary report for 2025 indicates 93,516 passengers in the regional network and an annual segment loss of €688,000, on segment revenues of €6.924 million and expenditure of €7.612 million. These are segment figures, not separate results per airport. [9]

The 2024 regional losses were much larger, but the report explains the impact of asset impairment on that year. The reduction of the loss in 2025 cannot be interpreted entirely as operational efficiency gains. In Q4 2025, Pärnu had only 308 passengers, while Tartu had 12,277; these are quarterly figures, influenced by seasonality. [9]

Tartu benefits from a public service agreement with Finnair for the period 31 March 2024 – 31 December 2027, with total municipal compensation of €3.2 million. This finances the route and is distinct from financing the airport operator. [10] The result is positive for connectivity, but commercially limited: common administration does not eliminate the need for public support, nor the low use of some platforms.

Georgia and growth within a mixed system

United Airports of Georgia owns three international and three domestic airports. Kutaisi and the domestic airports are administered by UAG, while Tbilisi and Batumi are run by a private operator. UAG reports for Kutaisi an average annual traffic growth of 35.1% over 2015–2019. This is a positive historical result, prior to the pandemic, not an indicator for 2025. [11] Over the long term, the example is strong for northern Moldova: after the 2012 reconstruction and reopening by the state operator, Kutaisi grew from about 188,000 passengers in 2013 to over 1.7 million in 2024, mainly thanks to a base of the low-cost carrier Wizz Air. For Bălți, the lesson is that a public regional airport can grow quickly if it has an anchor operator and an accessible market. [12]

The growth coincides with the development of tourism and the liberalization of the market, so it cannot be attributed exclusively to the public structure. The source does not demonstrate the profitability of each domestic airport. The lesson for Moldova is that a national strategy can support regional airports, but common ownership does not guarantee the commercial success of all of them.

When regional development fails

The counterexamples are just as instructive, but they must be read correctly. The Spanish airport Ciudad Real — over one billion euro invested, about 190,000 passengers over its entire existence, and closure roughly three years after opening, because the promised rail access was never built and demand was absent — was not part of the national network, but a private and regional project, outside the state operator AENA. [13] It does not demonstrate the failure of the single-operator model, but the general risk of building infrastructure without demand and without surface access — a direct warning for Cahul. The risk specific to a state network is different: even where the model works, many small airports remain chronically loss-making. At European level, the state-aid rules confirm this fragility: over 2014–2024 operating aid was allowed up to 80% for airports below 700,000 passengers and up to 50% for those below 3 million, and the Commission acknowledged that many airports below 1 million passengers would still need support after 2024. [14] The conclusion for Moldova is that the development of Bălți and Cahul can be guaranteed only if it is accompanied by a real demand base, surface access and a transparent public-support plan, not by the assumption that regional airports quickly become profitable.

Possible benefits and risks that must be controlled

What the network can gain

Common administration can reduce overlaps in procurement, accounting, legal assistance, IT systems and marketing. The competences developed in Chișinău can support staff training and the operational standards of the regional airports. The savings must be estimated after deducting the integration costs; the teams needed for safety at each airport cannot be eliminated merely to cut expenditure.

A common strategy can order investment and avoid regional projects competing for the same limited demand. The operator could offer airlines a coordinated proposition, adapted to the passenger catchments. This advantage does not guarantee that routes will appear, nor that ticket prices will fall.

Bălți and Cahul can improve regional access and provide alternative capacity for certain situations of activity disruption. The reserve value appears only if the infrastructure, staff and authorizations allow the operations concerned. An airport that exists on the map is not automatically a functional alternative.

Exposure of the whole enterprise to the same debts

Within a single legal person, the losses and obligations assumed for one airport can affect the liquidity of the entire operator. Taking over Moldaeroservice is the critical point. Separate accounting per airport helps control but does not create legal separation of liability. Internal spending caps do not eliminate creditors’ rights, nor the insolvency risk of the common operator.

The necessary protection includes settling the liabilities before absorption or within the approved legal mechanism, an independent valuation, liquidity reserves and phased regional investment. Symmetrically, since within a single enterprise Chișinău’s priorities can block regional investment, the development of Bălți and Cahul must be guaranteed through a protected regional budget, with committed targets and deadlines, that cannot be postponed in order to finance Chișinău alone. If the residual risk remains too high, the objective of a single state enterprise must be reconsidered in favour of a structure that legally separates the risks.

Monopoly and non-transparent financing

Concentrating administration reduces the possibility of competition among the airports included. The operator may favour one platform, one carrier or one supplier. Tariffs, discounts and access to infrastructure must follow public and non-discriminatory criteria, under the supervision of the competent authorities. The operator function must remain distinct from the regulation and control of aviation safety.

Using Chișinău’s revenues to cover regional losses must be done visibly, with approved limits and published impact. Capital injections, guarantees, operational support and commercial incentives must be examined through the lens of the applicable rules on competition and state aid.

Investment without demand and politicized management

The most costly outcome would be a network of oversized infrastructure, with permanent expenditure and few flights. The risk is reduced through prudent forecasts, low-traffic scenarios, phased investment and the possibility of stopping the expansion. Competitive selection of management, external audit and publication of procurement are conditions of the model.

How much the reorganization could cost

The estimate below is a planning exercise in euro, with assumptions formulated for this document. It is not a bill of quantities, a property valuation, a consultancy offer or a forecast of judicial compensation. The amounts are exclusive of VAT, should it become applicable, and exclude subsequent financing or indexation. They must be replaced by offers, valuations and the data of the insolvency file.

Administrative costs of setting up the operator

For an integration of 12–18 months, an indicative working range is €0.40–1.30 million. The duration is an assumption for administrative integration; litigation, expropriation or insolvency may take longer. The usual salary costs of existing staff are not automatically added to this budget.

Component	Cost assumption
Legal and financial audit, restructuring and documentation	€120,000–400,000
Inventory, cadastre and valuations for reorganization	€60,000–180,000
IT, accounting and procedures integration	€100,000–300,000
Staff transition, training and communication	€80,000–300,000
Documenting the Mărculești transfer and registrations	€40,000–120,000
Indicative administrative total	€400,000–1,300,000

The first item assumes 200–400 expert-days, at a hypothetical cost of €600–1,000/day. The others are planning allocations, not tariffs observed in comparable procurement. The Cahul expropriation valuation is budgeted separately. Actual salary compensation depends on the number of affected employees; the range does not constitute a legal ceiling on their rights.

Cahul and the difference between asking price and compensation

In October 2024, the press reported an asking price of €2.5 million for the former Cahul airport. The same report reproduced the CAA’s finding regarding the deterioration of the infrastructure and the lack of some essential equipment. The advertised price is a historical benchmark, not a transaction price, a market value verified in 2026, or a legally established compensation. [15]

To test the budget we use three compensation assumptions: €2.0 million, €2.5 million and €4.0 million. The €2.0 and €4.0 million values are chosen solely for sensitivity analysis around the public benchmark; they do not represent estimated limits of the valuation. The actual result may lie outside them.

An assumed allocation of €150,000–500,000 is added for valuations, cadastre, documentation, legal assistance and expropriation litigation. The extent of the acquired rights and of the compensable damages must be established legally. The compensation assumption must include the valued rights, in order to avoid adding the same value twice, for example by mechanically summing the value of the asset with its mortgage.

Budget scenarios and still-unknown costs

The table shows the hypothetical requirement for the reorganization and the acquisition of Cahul. It does not represent the cost of opening two regional airports and does not include paying Moldaeroservice’s debts. The scenarios have no probabilities assigned.

Million euro	Low	Central	High
Administrative reorganization	0.40	0.80	1.30
Cahul compensation — assumption	2.00	2.50	4.00
Expropriation procedure	0.15	0.30	0.50
Subtotal	2.55	3.60	5.80
20% planning reserve	0.51	0.72	1.16
Illustrative requirement	3.06	4.32	6.96

The reserve is a liquidity margin applied to the subtotal, not an automatic increase of the compensation, nor a guarantee that the budget will be sufficient. The central scenario results from 0.80 + 2.50 + 0.30 million euro, plus the 20% reserve. Within this frame, the illustrative order of magnitude is €3–7 million, before debts and airport works.

Moldaeroservice’s liabilities remain a decisive variable

The additional requirement for Moldaeroservice’s creditors must be calculated from the updated table of claims, the current obligations and the restructuring solution. From this requirement, the receivables that Moldaeroservice itself has to recover from its debtors — among them the “Bălți” FEZ administration and the state, through the compensatory obligations under Government Decision no. 983/2010 — must be deducted, because collecting them reduces the net financing (D). Historical accounting figures do not replace this calculation. Denoting by D the net financing actually needed for the approved solution, the central scenario becomes €4.32 million + D, before investment. D must not be automatically confused with the total accounting debts.

As a simple sensitivity, a D of €1 million would bring this subtotal to €5.32 million, and a D of €3 million to €7.32 million. These values of D are not estimates of the actual debt. If assets are taken over through a procedure other than absorption, the price and obligations of that scenario must be recalculated, without mechanically summing two alternative solutions.

Rehabilitation and operation require a distinct budget

At Cahul, acquiring the assets is not equivalent to acquiring a functional commercial airport. Repairs to the runway, taxiways and apron, the installations, the rescue and firefighting services, security, the terminal and authorization can substantially change the budget. At Bălți the same categories of checks are needed, according to the actual condition and the proposed operations.

Without technical expertise there is no sufficient basis to present a credible estimate of these investments. The total cost must be formulated as follows:

reorganization and acquisition + net financing of the Moldaeroservice solution + civil investment + working capital + the costs of the military transfer not already included + applicable taxes and financing.

Annual support for operation or routes is budgeted separately. The €3–7 million estimate cannot be presented as the total cost of the reform.

Bălți–Leadoveni and Cahul: a comparative investment analysis (LUBL–LUCH)

Assuming an integrated national network of civil airports is set up, Bălți–Leadoveni International Airport (LUBL/BZY) and Cahul Airport (LUCH) should not be analysed primarily as competing infrastructures, but as two regional airports with complementary catchment areas and territorial functions: Bălți–Leadoveni for the north of the Republic of Moldova, and Cahul for the south of the country and, potentially, for part of the Moldovan-Romanian cross-border catchment. Chișinău International Airport would remain the main national hub. Documented data must be separated from planning estimates and from values that require confirmation through technical expertise.

1. Accessibility and catchment area

Bălți–Leadoveni (LUBL) benefits from the proximity of the second urban pole of the Republic of Moldova and from its location next to one of the main road corridors of the country’s north. The airport is located about 15 km from the centre of Bălți municipality and about 9–10 km from the edge of the urban area, with access via the M5/E583 corridor. The location allows relatively quick access from Bălți and from the Rîșcani, Glodeni, Fălești, Sîngerei and Drochia districts and, within a wider travel range, from Edineț, Briceni, Ocnița, Dondușeni, Soroca and Florești. The existence of the rail network around Bălți and the proximity of the Pelinia station additionally offer the possibility of developing, in the long term, an intermodal connection.

The importance of this area is confirmed by demographic data. The 2024 census indicates 608,700 inhabitants in the North Development Region, and Bălți municipality has 94,500 inhabitants with usual residence, being by far the most important urban centre of the north. [16]

Therefore, for a preliminary analysis, LUBL can be considered to have a primary catchment of the order of 300,000–400,000 people, corresponding to about one hour of road access, and an extended catchment of about 550,000–700,000 people at 90–120 minutes. The latter value may partly include the population near the Ukrainian border, but this must not be counted as guaranteed demand. The exact delimitation must be carried out through a 30/60/90/120-minute GIS drive-time study.

Cahul (LUCH) has the advantage of a shorter distance from the urban centre. Access is via the R32 and the L669 road, designated as the airport access road. This existing infrastructure reduces the need to build an entirely new road corridor, although the condition and capacity of the road must be assessed before commercial traffic resumes.

The internal demographic base is, however, smaller than in Bălți’s case. The 2024 census indicates 306,700 inhabitants for the South Development Region, to which are added 103,700 inhabitants in ATU Gagauzia. Cahul district has 72,800 inhabitants, and Cahul town about 22,200. [16]

LUCH’s specific advantage is its very close position to Romania. Therefore, its catchment must not be calculated only within the administrative limits of the Republic of Moldova; the attractiveness for Cahul–Cantemir–Taraclia–Comrat–Vulcănești–Giurgiulești, as well as for the Oancea–Galați area in Romania, must be tested separately. The Romanian component must, however, be weighted by the actual border-crossing time and by competition from Galați Airport, if it becomes operational, as well as from the Iași and Bacău airports.

As a preliminary assumption, LUCH could have a primary Moldovan catchment of about 150,000–220,000 people and an extended one, including Gagauzia and the accessible cross-border areas, of the order of 350,000–500,000 people. These figures are planning assumptions, not the results of a GIS study.

2. Existing infrastructure and the difference in technical risk

For LUBL, the fundamental advantage is the existence of an airport site built for commercial aviation, with a 15/33 runway of about 2,240 × 42 mExtensibilă până la 3.500 m, inclusiv aproximativ 500 m de teren pregătit încă din 1987 prin lucrări de terasament pentru prelungirea pistei; pista poate fi, de asemenea, lărgită. Configurația amplasamentului oferă suplimentar posibilitatea dezvoltării, pe termen lung, a unei a doua piste pe platoul învecinat., taxiways and an apron. Archival technical documentation describes a runway structure of about 49 cm, made up of about 24 cm of concrete, 20 cm of sand-cement and 5 cm of bitumen-treated soil. The historical value PCN 16 R/A/W/T must not, however, be confused with a currently certified bearing capacity. [17]

Before any investment decision, PCI, HWD/FWD, GPR, cores and geotechnical investigations are needed. Exactly this type of investigation had been envisaged in the ADP Ingénierie offer: assessment of the runway, taxiways and apron, determination of PCI/PCN and, if the existing documentation is insufficient, additional geotechnical investigations. The NACO–InterVISTAS proposal in turn provided for technical due diligence, a traffic forecast, CAPEX/OPEX and a Master Plan. [18]

Therefore, it is not technically justified to assert at present that the LUBL runway must necessarily be rebuilt entirely. Expertise may lead to one of three solutions: repairs and limited reopening; strengthening/overlay; or structural reconstruction.

For LUCH, the degree of uncertainty is greater. Before establishing a credible budget, the runway, apron, drainage, electrical infrastructure, buildings, perimeter security and utilities must be fully assessed. Consequently, any current estimate must be presented as an order of magnitude, not a bill of quantities.

3. Two different investment stages

For both airports it is useful to separate a Stage A – Minimum Viable Airport (MVA), with the investment strictly needed for certification and the rapid launch of a limited number of commercial flights, and a Stage B – full modernization, with infrastructure designed for development over 15–20 years, A320/A321/B737 aircraft, a modern terminal, aprons, approach systems, cargo and subsequent expansion.

Bălți–Leadoveni – preliminary order of magnitude

For LUBL, subject to pavement expertise, an accelerated reopening scenario (MVA) could require about €15–30 million, including expertise and design, the strictly necessary rehabilitation/strengthening of the runway, taxiways and apron, drainage, markings and lighting, fencing and security, electrical installations, handling and rescue-firefighting equipment, border/customs infrastructure and an initial compact or modular terminal. If the investigations were to show that the existing structure requires major structural intervention, this range would have to be increased.

For a full modernization of LUBL, with a strengthened and possibly extended runway to about 2,800–3,000 m, an enlarged apron, a permanent terminal, modern approach and navigation systems, cargo infrastructure, parking and utilities, a reasonable preliminary order of magnitude would be €50–90 million, with the possibility of exceeding €100 million in a maximalist scenario with an oversized terminal, hangars, a complex cargo facility and a major runway extension.

It is relevant that, in December 2019, the transport expert Oleg Țofilat publicly cited, in an interview with Radio Free Europe, an estimate of about €50 million for reopening Bălți, associated with a scenario of about 3–3.5 A320/B737 flights per day; he specified, however, that this does not replace a professional feasibility study. [19]

Cahul – preliminary order of magnitude

For LUCH a greater margin of uncertainty must be applied. A minimal scenario of returning it to operation can be preliminarily estimated at €15–35 million, if expertise confirms the possibility of reusing an important part of the existing infrastructure. Conversely, if the runway and airport infrastructure must be substantially rebuilt, and the airport must be brought to the standard needed for regular A320/B737 operations, a complete programme may reach about €45–80 million, possibly more if major intervention is needed on the ground, drainage, runway extension or the full construction of the terminal and apron.

Therefore, it would not be prudent for the state to establish now that LUCH is “cheaper” or “more expensive” than LUBL. The comparison must be made after physical expertise of both infrastructures, using the same technical methodology and the same critical aircraft.

4. European benchmarks

Orders of magnitude must be related to real projects. At Baia Mare, the project for extending and modernizing the airport surfaces had an estimated value of about RON 64.8 million excluding VAT, including runway, taxiways, aprons, lighting, drainage and related works; the runway, taxiway, apron and technological-road works alone represented about RON 35.45 million. [20]

At Satu Mare, the much larger rehabilitation and modernization programme — runway, apron, runway-strip bearing capacity, terminal and equipment — has a value of about RON 306.9 million excluding VAT, the works contract being about RON 275.8 million. [21]

Oradea, in turn, demonstrates that the terminal can be a significant investment component on its own: the project provided for increasing the built area from about 2,925 m² to about 12,500 m² and a capacity of 800 passengers/hour. [22]

These examples show why designing a very large terminal from the outset at Bălți or Cahul is not justified. For the first years it is economically more prudent to have a modular or extensible terminal, sized for the real traffic peak, directing a larger share of the initial CAPEX towards the critical safety and operating infrastructure.

5. Possible traffic in the first three years

The forecast must be built bottom-up, starting from frequencies, aircraft capacity and load factor, not merely by applying a percentage to the population. A prudent launch scenario could be, for LUBL/BZY and LUCH respectively: in year 1, 120,000–180,000 and 40,000–70,000 passengers; in year 2, 200,000–300,000 and 70,000–110,000; in year 3, 300,000–450,000 and 100,000–160,000.

For LUBL, 150,000 passengers/year means only about 410 passengers/day in both directions. At an average of 170 seats and a load factor of 80–85%, this corresponds to about 1.4–1.5 commercial departures per day plus the corresponding arrivals. At 300,000 passengers/year, the order of magnitude becomes about three daily departures. For Cahul, 50,000 passengers/year represents about 137 passengers/day in both directions and can be built initially through a few weekly frequencies to markets with a diaspora or through a mix of scheduled and seasonal flights.

These values are not certified forecasts. They are sizing scenarios that must be validated through a demand study: MIDR/CAA data, the geographical distribution of KIV and IAS passengers, telephone/mobility data if available, O&D surveys, diaspora, bookings and fares, competition from neighbouring airports and direct discussions with carriers.

6. Why the common network can change the economics of the projects

The Lithuanian example is institutionally relevant. A single state company, Lithuanian Airports, administers Vilnius, Kaunas and the regional airport Palanga. In 2025 the three airports together processed about 7.16 million passengers: 5.11 million at Vilnius, nearly 1.6 million at Kaunas and 448,000 at Palanga. [23]

The model shows that a regional airport must not be analysed solely through its isolated profitability. A network allows the centralization of procurement, IT, marketing, negotiations with carriers, certain administrative functions and CAPEX planning, while keeping the local operations necessary for each airport. Applied to the Republic of Moldova, the logic would be: Chișinău as the main national hub, Bălți–Leadoveni as the regional airport of the North and Cahul as the regional airport of the South. In this configuration, the objective would not be the needless multiplication of infrastructure, but the creation of a network in which investment is phased according to demonstrated demand.

Preliminary conclusion (LUBL–LUCH)

From a strictly market perspective, LUBL starts with a larger internal demographic base, concentrated around the country’s second urban centre and a North region of 608,700 inhabitants. LUCH has a smaller internal base, but benefits from the proximity of Cahul town, the dedicated road access and the cross-border position, which can extend its potential market towards Gagauzia, southern Moldova and Romania. [16]

From an investment perspective, the difference cannot be established rigorously before comparable expertise of the two sites. For LUBL there is sufficient information to consider it realistic to examine both a phased reopening of the order of €15–30 million and a full modernization of the order of €50–90 million. For LUCH, the lack of a contemporary technical diagnosis justifies a wider preliminary range, of about €15–35 million for a minimal solution and €45–80+ million for reconstruction and full modernization.

These values must be regarded as screening budgets, not bills of quantities. Before investment approval, both airports should undergo the same independent procedure: structural pavement expertise → PCI/PCR/PCN → geotechnics and drainage → obstacles and limitation surfaces → assessment of terminals and utilities → GIS catchment → O&D forecast → traffic scenarios → CAPEX/OPEX → CBA/ENPV/EIRR → phased Master Plan. Only after this analysis can the real cost of reopening LUBL and LUCH be established comparably.

How the proposal can be implemented

First, the total cost must be demonstrated

The Government should commission a comparative analysis between keeping the current structure, the single operator and common coordination with legally separate entities. The assessment must include resolving Moldaeroservice’s insolvency, acquiring Cahul, the investment and recurring costs of all the airports, and the effects of transferring Mărculești to defence.

The budget must separate the one-off reorganization and acquisition costs from the annual expenditure. Administrative savings must not be counted before they are realized, and traffic estimates must be tested in an unfavourable scenario too. Without these data, a particular saving, payback period or subsidy value cannot be responsibly supported.

Four conditions before effective integration

For Moldaeroservice, a legal and financial solution verified in the insolvency file is needed. The solution must also include recovering the enterprise’s own receivables from its debtors, such as the “Bălți” FEZ administration. For Cahul, the justification of public utility, clarification of ownership and financing of the compensation are needed. For Mărculești, the destination, the transferred estate and the resources of the Ministry of Defence must be approved. For AIC, the capacity to sustain the reorganization without affecting its essential activity must be demonstrated.

Subsequently, the acts of reorganization, the change of name and statute, the assignment of assets and the necessary registrations can be adopted. The timetable must be correlated with the resolution of the procedures, not with a political date announced before the assessment. Changes concerning the operator and the infrastructure must be coordinated with the Civil Aviation Authority; the existence of a single enterprise does not replace the requirements applicable to each airport.

Financial rules and public results

Each airport must have its budget, revenues, costs, investment and indicators reported separately. The budget of each regional airport must include a guaranteed and protected minimum level of investment, so that the development of Bălți and Cahul does not depend on the revenue left after covering Chișinău’s priorities. For each regional airport, the plan must contain measurable targets — annual investment amounts, traffic thresholds and deadlines —, reported publicly every year; repeated failure to meet them must trigger a review, not silence. The network must also publish the consolidated situation, so that internal transfers do not hide the real cost of the regional airports. Financing a public mission must specify the service required, the eligible cost, the source of the funds and the method of verification.

The relevant indicators include safety, infrastructure availability, service quality, cash flow, the need for public support, the realization of investment and capacity utilization. Passenger numbers are important, but must not become the sole criterion for financing or for evaluating management.

Conclusion of the proposal

The state enterprise “Airports of Moldova” can be a coherent option for administering the Chișinău, Bălți–Leadoveni and Cahul airports. It offers the possibility of a common strategy, the use of existing competences and phased regional development. Transferring Mărculești to the Ministry of Defence can clarify responsibilities, if it is justified and financed separately.

Support for this formula must be tied to four verifiable results: Bălți–Leadoveni and Cahul develop effectively and in a balanced way, with investment and traffic realized according to a committed timetable; Moldaeroservice’s creditors are treated legally, and the enterprise’s own receivables — against debtors such as the “Bălți” FEZ administration and the state (Government Decision no. 983/2010) — are recovered; Cahul is acquired with respect for property and the public budget; and Chișinău remains financially and operationally solid, as the foundation of the entire network. The reform is justified when the network’s benefits exceed the costs and the risks of concentrating them in a single enterprise.

Sources and limits of verification

The document formulates a public-policy proposal, based on public sources consulted on 21 September 2026. The proposed roles of the airports, the benefits and the control measures are analytical conclusions, not the findings of feasibility studies already carried out.

[1] Public Property Agency — Moldaeroservice and the date of entry into insolvency: https://app.gov.md/companies/moldaeroservice/

[2] Insolvency Law no. 149/2012 — State Register of Legal Acts

[3] Law no. 246/2017 on the state enterprise and the municipal enterprise

[4] Law on expropriation for a cause of public utility no. 488/1999

[5] Moldova 1 — Status of the absorption of Mărculești airport, 9 September 2026

[6] Avinor (Norway), Finavia (Finland), Swedavia (Sweden), AENA (Spain) — national state operators of airport networks and cross-subsidy

[7] Lithuanian Airports — Managed airports

[8] AS Tallinna Lennujaam — Structure and objectives of the operator

[9] Tallinn Airport — Preliminary report 2025, pages 4 and 8

[10] Tartu City Hall — Public service agreement for the Helsinki route

[11] United Airports of Georgia — Ownership and administration of the airports

[12] Kutaisi International Airport — traffic evolution 2013–2024 and the Wizz Air base

[13] Ciudad Real (Spain) — a private/regional project outside AENA: cost, low traffic and closure

[14] European Commission / ACI Europe — state aid for regional airports (the 2014 Guidelines, operating thresholds)

[15] UNIMEDIA — The asking price for Cahul and the CAA’s clarifications, 4 October 2024

[16] National Bureau of Statistics — Population and Housing Census 2024 (geographical distribution of the population)

[17] Archival technical documentation of Bălți–Leadoveni aerodrome — runway characteristics and historical PCN (16 R/A/W/T)

[18] ADP Ingénierie and NACO–InterVISTAS offers (2020) — technical assessment and feasibility study for Bălți–Leadoveni

[19] Oleg Țofilat, interview with Radio Free Europe, 9 December 2019 — estimate of about €50 million and ~3–3.5 flights/day for reopening Bălți–Leadoveni: https://www.europalibera.md/a/30316049.html

[20] Baia Mare International Airport — “Extension and modernization of airport surfaces” (tender value)

[21] Satu Mare International Airport — “Rehabilitation and modernization of movement areas and terminal extension”

[22] Bihor County Council / Oradea Airport — the new passenger terminal project (capacity 800 pax/hour)

[23] Lithuanian Airports (LTOU) — 2025 traffic results (Vilnius, Kaunas, Palanga)

[24] Public Property Agency — financial indicators of S.E. “Mărculești International Airport” and S.E. “Moldaeroservice” (2019–2025): app.gov.md

[25] Anticoruptie.md — investigation into arms trafficking, embezzlement and debts at Mărculești International Airport, 17 July 2019

[26] Law no. 232/2025 on budget allocations for Mărculești airport

[27] Statute of S.E. “Mărculești International Airport” (registered 30.01.2004; Government Decision no. 444/2002) — founder the Ministry of Defence, Article 14 (leasing conditioned on the founder’s consent)

[28] Court of Accounts of the Republic of Moldova — Decision no. 32/2007 “on the report on the management of state property by S.E. «Moldaeroservice» and S.E. «Mărculești International Airport» for the years 2005–2006” (Official Gazette no. 117–126/2007) and Decision no. 18/2005 (Leadoveni runway at ICAO level, “but mothballed”)

[29] Official replies on Mărculești’s absence from EU investment frameworks — European Commission (C(2026) 3937 final), European Investment Bank (WO1950276), EBRD (R923329)

[30] OCCRP — the “Arms-Washing: Ukraine Network Moves Embargoed European Arms to Africa and the Middle East” investigation

Notes for interpreting the analysis

Not available for this analysis were the updated judicial file of Moldaeroservice, the final table of claims, the current cadastral extracts of Cahul and the final inventory of transfers concerning Mărculești. Therefore, the document does not confirm the immediate possibility of the absorption, the identity of all the rights holders, or the cost of the takeovers.

The legislative references identify the relevant framework; the consolidated form in force and its application to the concrete operations must be verified before drafting the acts. This includes verifying the Civil Code, the regime for administering public property, the rules on transferring assets and the special regime of Mărculești.

The APP page confirms that Moldaeroservice is still publicly classified in the category of enterprises in insolvency. By the ruling of the Chișinău Court (Central seat) of 29 September 2022 (file no. 2i-171/22), by which insolvency proceedings were opened against S.E. “Moldaeroservice”, the insolvency administrator was required “to submit a Report concerning the causes that led to the debtor’s insolvency, with the identification of the culpable persons and the grounds for engaging their liability according to law”; this mandatory report was not, however, drawn up, so the persons culpable for bringing the enterprise into insolvency have not been identified and have not been held liable. The APP page does not replace a judicial confirmation of the stage of the procedure. The Moldova 1 report is used for the publicly announced context about Mărculești, without replacing the transfer acts and the property registrations.